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Comment on Borjas
by
     Jagdish Bhagwati
These comments were made at a Michigan University Conference in Washington D.C. in Spring
1998.
I should say at the outset that, much as I have found his mpirical research on
immigration into the United States  to be a most useful and valuable addition to the many
important contributions made over the years by US immigration experts such as the late Julian
Simon and the pioneering researcher  Barry Chiswick, I intend to express in a friendly and
scholarly way my almost total disagreement with Professor George Borjas’s analysis of the
impact of immigration and, even more, with his views on immigration policy. I believe that my
differences derive from several reasons, among them:
first, I started thinking and writing about immigration questions a quarter of a century ago
and  in the context of general equilibrium models that we trade theorists typically usei whereas
Borjas got into the subject much later and from familiarity with the labor economist’s typical use
of partial equilibrium tools instead;
second, the theorists and empiricists of immigration in the last quarter of a century
considered a range of theoretical and policy issues (e.g. the conceptual question of how to define
the social welfare function for a country in the presence of migrationii,  the question of optimal
income tax policy in the presence of international personal mobilityiii, or the differentiated
modeling of migration depending on the kinds of skills involvediv) which are missing from, and
hence handicap, Borjas’s analysisv;
third, a sensible discussion of immigration policy requires in my view that the economic
analysis both reflect, and be situated squarely within the context of, ethical and sociological
analysis whereas Borjas typically ignores these aspects and hence is handicapped by his narrow
focus;
fourth,  like the late Julian Simon, I am strongly biased in favor of a relaxed view of
immigration whereas Borjas inclines, I believe,  towards a more cautious and skeptical, if not
hostile,  view of the matter; and
fifth, I find both morally unacceptable, and economically unconvincing, his view that we
ought to favor skilled over unskilled immigrants.
Whose Welfare?
Let me begin with Borjas’s definition of how we must evaluate the effects of migrants on
US welfare.  Borjas, unlike in his earlier writings, now distinguishes clearly, as we learnt to do in
the 1960svi, between the welfare of the “migrants” and that of those already here (whether native-
born or naturalized or legal and illegal aliens), i.e. “us”. That is all to the good.
But he is wrong to argue that we in the United States must be concerned only with the
economic effect on us. This is sociologically and ethically an untenable viewpoint. As I have
long argued, whether one treats migrants’ welfare as part of  “US welfare”  depends on the nature
of the migration as also on the moral nature of our society.  With permanent immigrants, it is
likely that we will view their welfare as part of  US welfare: after all, the immigrants are joining
our society. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible that, especially with the temporary and the
“yo-yo” migrants who move back and forth, as with the guestworkers  programs of Western
Europe, some societies may not think so (though, even here, recall the solidarity expressed by
some German labor unions with the guestworkers, the gastarbeiters, in their famous slogan: ihr
kampf ist unser kampf)vii. With illegal immigrants, the willingness to consider the welfare of
immigrants as part of social  welfare may be even more tenuous (though I plan to explore that too
below). Equally, it is possible, in an analysis that embraces both the sending and the receiving
countries, that the migrants’ welfare will be considered part of neither country or as part of both
countries’ welfare. 
Borjas therefore is wrong to think that the only plausible view to take is for our national
economic welfare function to be defined purely on us and this, in turn, to be evaluated in terms of
available goods and services as affected by the inflow of the immigrants. He considers that this is
how Americans view immigration politically. I do not think so at all.
Thus, I believe that Americans, whose society has been uniquely formed by immigration,
do have a morally-informed views on bothwhich kinds of immigrants they would favor (thus
implicitly indulging in interpersonal comparisons) and h w immigrants must be treated, whether
legal or illegal, once they are in their midst.viii  And, on both counts, disregarding wholly the
altogether separate question of how different immigrants will affect “our” economic welfare,
American are typically likely, even today, to show both decency and good moral sense.
Take the question of which k nd of immigrants we would favor. Conduct a mental
experiment. Assume that we have one immigrant visa to offer and there are two applicants: a
skilled and well-heeled doctor and an unskilled and impoverished peasant. Banish all thoughts as
to whether the doctor will add more to our economic welfare: it might help to think of either
being settled sight unseen on a remote “paradise island” and being out of our lives before and
after our choice. Whom would we then choose for the largesse? I have little doubt that most
Americans would take in the peasant. That is what the Statue of Liberty is all about: taking in
those whose needs are the greatest. In virtually ignoring this essence of American moral
sensibility, Borjas unwittingly reduces the Statue of Liberty, with her outstretched hand holding
the torch of liberty, to a monument instead  to New York’s subway rider with her raised hand
holding on to the overhead strap as the train lurches along the labyrinthine tracks.
Nor does Borjas’s focus on considering only our economic welfare come to grips with
what I take to be the dominant American moral sense when he fails to consider also the
immigrants’ welfare once they are in our midst. In deciding how we should deter illegal
immigration, for example, Borjas’s focus would make us gladly put up with one or all of
measures such as employer sanctions, the use of ID cards, deprivation of schooling for childrenix
et.al. which are likely, almost certain, to propel the illegals in our midst towards an underclass
status without access to many of the economic and social “goods” enjoyed by the rest of us. In
doing so, he and others so inclined discount the fact that, as I have argued recently in the Boston
Review:x
“The explanation [of the American sense that we should “tr at people who are here,
whether native or naturalized or alien, with the basic decency  that each of us owes to others”]
lies in our history: the absence of an identity defined by shared memories that define “us” against
“others”, and a history of immigration that leads the culture to pride itself on ensuring chances
for each and all. Our sensibility is offended at its core when we contemplate that any group, any
individual, is denied fair access to the opportunities that our country offers. The notion that we
can thus live alongside an underclass of humanity, denied access to social benefits and economic
betterment simply because its members are illegal aliens, violates our fundamental sense of
decency and morality.”
I would even add that, in this regard, I have been struck particularly by a possible parallel
between the way we wish to treat equally well all in our midst, and the absence in our culture of
the Cinderella complex, the differentially advantaged treatment of one’s natural over that of
one’s adopted or acquired children. I hazard the view, based on my casual observation of other
cultures, that there is no particular opprobrium there in discriminating in favor of one’s natural
children, whereas in our culture, this is simply beyond the pale: all children, once in one’s
charge,  are the same.
Economic Effects on Us
Having therefore rejected as indefensible for US immigration policy analysis the
exclusive Borjas concern with “our” economic welfare, let me now accept this focus and still
disagree with his analysis and conclusions. There are three main issues I wish to comment on.
1. Aggregate Income versus Income Distribution:  Borjas seems to accept that immigration will
improve our welfare, in the aggregate. [I find it difficult to see, however, why he is unwilling to
put a figure on this gain, considering he shows no shyness in turning out estimates that require
even more heroic empirical assumptions. Such empirical estimates would help define the
empirical tradeoff between the income gain and the distributional problems that Borjas believes,
but which I shall argue below to be implausible, to be the outcomes of current unskilled
immigration, and hence also enable us to consider more meaningfully whether “compensation”
to the damaged parties could be financed from the gains that the immigration brings.]
The problem is that, despite Borjas’s conviction that unskilled immigration, which has to
be largely illegal immigration (which is almost exclusively of the unskilled) but also includes
some who come in on the refugee entries and others admitted under the familial programs,
affects the real wages of our unskilled workers adversely, I would maintain that this case is
hardly proven. The original Mariel boatlift study of David Card had first indicated that the effect
of the influx of roughly 100,000 Cubans into Miami had left the average wages unchanged. What
had happened then to “diminishing returns”? There were two answers to this puzzle once the
partial-equilibrium habit of mind was abandoned. First, the normal influx of other migrants into
Miami and the efflux of Miami residents elsewhere could have adjusted to the Cuban inflow and
offset it. Second, the Cuban inflow may well have left Miami within the Chipman-McKenzie
diversification cone, killing the diminishing returns as we well know from general-equilibrium
analysis. By now, the labor economists are well aware of these possibilities. But their full import
is not understood, in my view.
Thus, Borjas claims that the local effects in the states such as Florida, to which the
unskilled and often illegal immigrants go,  are masked by the net outflow of previous residents
from these states, with the implication that the “problem” of adverse effect on wages is simply
exported elsewhere, thus presumably is likely to surface there. But Francisco Rivera-Batiz has
produced reliable refutation of this argument (based on reliance on shaky evidence from a
sociological study): breaking down the outflow by skills shows (Table 1) that the states receiving
the unskilled immigrants have largely experienced outflows of skilled residents. In itself,
therefore, the failure to show serious adverse impact in the states of immigration on wages from
the unskilled immigration cannot be explained away in the fashion Borjas seems to favor.
But Rivera-Batiz’s calculations suggest strongly that the diversification-cone argument
may be the overriding reason why we have not observed the enduring and adverse impact
anywhere on the wages of the unskilled here. For, it is obvious that the different labor markets
around the country are connected, so that the diversification cone needs to be defined on more-
than-local endowments. If it is defined over national endowments, and we reckon with the fact
that capital accumulates at a rate more or less commensurate with the growth of the labor force
(inclusive of all immigration) and of unskilled labor force by itself as well, all at the national
level, it becomes harder to expect that the immigration we have observed to date can be a source
of any noticeable adverse effect on the wages of the unskilled. If so, the Borjas concerns about
income distribution are simply exaggerated, at best, and ill-founded, at worst. In either case, we
ought to dismiss them from the public discourse.
2. Revenue Distribution: The income distributional implications can arise also in a different
sense which is fairly important, however. I believe that while there is some persisting
disagreement whether immigration, on balance, leads to a drain on public revenues, the
arguments going back well over a decade and raising a number of conceptual and measurement
differences, there is general  agreement that the Center tends to gain net revenues and the states
of (immediate) immigration tend to lose them.
The problem then is that, even if the former gain dominates the latter loss, if nothing is
done to compensate the losers, then the Governors of those states will have a huge political
incentive to seek transfers by way of “compensation”. Failing that, they will try to turn
immigration, and the “drain on their exchequers” , into a political issue. The competition for
schools, health services will become an issue. In fact, I would venture to say that Texas earlier,
and Governor Pete Wilson later, may well have chosen to go after truly offensive proposals to
deny schooling to children of illegal immigrants as a strategic political ploy to bring the entire
issue to center stage, rather than because they genuinely believed that this ought to be our policy.
What this points to, of course, is that the Federal responsibility for revenue transfers must match
the federal immigration policy: the state should not be left in the lurch.
3. Skilled versus Unskilled Immigration:  Let me conclude with the Borjas preference for skilled
migration. I have already said why it offends our moral sense about what types of immigrants we
ought to prefer. But I am presently addressing the separate issue: which type of immigrant is
better for us.
Here, if we assume that migrants earn the value of their marginal product, there is little
impact on the rest of us, one way or the other. So, the answer must be: we ought to be indifferent
among different levels of skills, on economic grounds. But that is where you get into the question
of (uncompensated) externalities. Are these externalities to us greater from the skilled? As
skilled members of the elite, we are naturally disposed to vote for that proposition! But frankly,
how do we know? I can readily imagine all sorts of externalities of importance from letting in a
Haitian maid, or having her come in illegally, enabling women to go into the workforce in New
York and yielding the social value of  increased facilitation of female participation in the
workforce. Again, unskilled immigrants who create economic opportunity for themselves in
inner cities in all sorts of ways may well  have a demonstration value for blacks who may
otherwise take too seriously the notion, not entirely wrong of course, that the inner cities “ lack
economic opportunities” : this demonstration value itself is an externality, lifting enlightened
black leaders from defeatism into hope and action. One could go on.
In fact, the whole problem with externalities is that, as we have known from the industrial
policy debates, they are the first refuge of the scoundrels. That is entirely accepted by
conservative economists, in particular. What I find ironic is that a conservative economist like
Borjas, who doubtless is suspicious of arguments based on externalities, is only too happy to
assert them when it comes to favoring the skilled migrants! I believe therefore that the growing
fetish for the skilled immigrants is just that, and we need to look at it straight in the face for the
morally unacceptable, and economically unjustified, prescription for changing our immigration
policy  that it is.
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ABSTRACT
This Comment disputes most of Professor George Borjas’s claims on the effects
of immigration and nearly all of  his recommendations in regard to US
immigration policy.
                                                
i There were important contributions in this literature by Harry Johnson, Herbert Grubel, Tony Scott et.al. For a
synthesis and review of that literature, see Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1976).
ii I take up this question immediately below.
iii There is thus a huge literature in public finance on this question. See, for example, Bhagwati and Wilson (1989),
Bhagwati (1991), Wilson (1982a)(1982b), and Mirrlees (1982).
iv Several theoretical models of professional migration and its consequences were developed by Koichi Hamada,
myself and others in Bhagwati and Partington (1976), for instance.
v It is perhaps indicative that Borjas’s references are almost entirely to himself (a failing that I share) and a narrow
set of his associates, suggesting disregard of not merely the earlier literature by Johnson, Grubel-Scott, Berry,
myself, Hamada, Mirrlees and many others, but also of recent literature by Barry Chiswick, Harriet Orcutt, Kar-yiu
Wong and many others.
vi Again, the first to draw this important distinction was Harry Johnson. It then became standard in the formal
discussions of the so-called “brain drain” that stimulated much of the theoretical and policy writings in the 1960s and
1970s.
vii Translated, the slogan means: Their battle is our battle.
viii Of course, Americans differ in what they think we owe to legal as distinct from illegal immigrants. Some, like me
and Owen Fiss, the constitutional lawyer at Yale, would treat both alike, and pretty much the way we treat ourselves;
but others would treat illegals less favorably. See the Symposium on “The Promise of Immigration” in the Boston
Review, Vol.23(5), October/November 1998.
ix Borjas himself does not approve of the deprivation of education for children. But he approves of nearly everything
else, as far as one can tell from his public writings. E.g. see his New York Times op.ed. article, “Punish Employers,
Not  Children”, July 11, 1996.
x The Boston Review, op.cit., page 21.
